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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE - MUNICIPAL WASTE CONTROL - The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a municipal waste flow control plan violated
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because the
plan required that all municipal waste generated within the
municipality for ten years be disposed of at one of three designated
sites.
Empire Sanitary Landfill v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 684
A2d 1047 (Pa. 1996).
In 1988, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Municipal Waste
Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act ("Act")' to protect the
public and the environment from dangers associated with the
transportation, processing, treatment, storage and disposal of
municipal waste.2 The Act permitted each Pennsylvania county to
submit a municipal waste management plan for approval to the
Department of Environmental Resources ("DER"), 3 specifying the
facilities at which it chose to process or dispose of municipal
waste.4 The Act required the counties to use a "fair, open and
competitive process for selecting such facilities,"5 but assumed that
counties would prefer processing and disposal sites located within
their borders.6 Furthermore, the Act mandated that the counties
choose facilities located within the state, and required detailed
justification for the use of out-of-county facilities.7
Consequently, Lehigh County adopted a waste flow control plan
1. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4000.101-.1904 (1988).
2. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.102(b)(3). The legislature passed the Act after determining
that nearly all Pennsylvania counties had inadequate capacity for processing and disposing of
municipal waste, and that most existing facilities would need replacement in the near future.
Id. at § 4000.102(a)(1)-(3). Therefore, the legislature sought to establish a cooperative
planning program while providing technical and financial assistance for solid waste
management. Id. at § 4000.102(b)(1).
3. Id. at § 4000.501(a).
4. Id. at § 4000.303(e). The legislature authorized counties to control the flow of
municipal waste, a measure deemed necessary to guarantee the long-term economic viability
of processing facilities and landfills, to ensure financing for new facilities and landfills, to
contain the long term cost of such facilities and landfills, and to protect existing capacity. Id.
at § 4000.102(a)(10).
5. Id. at § 4000.502(f)(2).
6. Id. at § 4000.102(a)(6). The legislature believed that giving priority to in-county
facilities ensured proper and adequate processing and disposal of municipal waste generated
within the county. Id.
7. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.502(g).
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that became effective in June 1992 after DER approval.8 Under the
plan, the county designated three landfills where all municipal
waste generated within the county was to be disposed of during
the ten-year contract period.9 However, all legally enforceable
contracts entered into before April 1991 were to remain in effect
until their original term ended. 0  Empire Sanitary Landfill
("Empire") and Danella Environmental Technologies ("Danella")
had made agreements after the effective date of the Act, but before
the effective date of the County Plan, under which Danella would
deliver waste to Empire." Although not specifying any minimum
amount, Empire agreed to reserve space in its facility for waste
delivered by Danella. 12
In 1992, Empire and Danella filed a joint petition for injunctive
relief against the County and the DER, insisting that the waste flow
control provisions of the Lehigh County Plan violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 3 They also
argued that the Empire-Danella agreements were protected under
both the Act and the County plan. 14 The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania granted the motion in part and denied in part, ruling
that the County plan violated the Commerce Clause to the extent
that the plan precluded transporting waste to facilities not located
in Pennsylvania. 15 The court also ruled that Danella could dispose
of its waste at Empire because the parties' agreement was
executed before the effective date of the County plan. 16 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the commonwealth court's
order. 17
Both parties then moved for summary judgment, and in 1994, the
8. Empire Sanitary Landfill v. Commonwealth, 684 A.2d 1047, 1051 (Pa 1996).
9. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1051. Under the Lehigh County plan, the designated sites were
to be selected after the county issued a Request for Proposals to any facility or disposal site
that desired consideration. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1058. Empire was not eligible for designation as a county landfill because it
failed to respond to the County's Request for Proposals. Id. at 1051.
13. Id. at 1052.
14. Id. The DER challenged the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania to hear the matter. The court, however, did not address this issue, stating only
that the proceeding fell within it's "original jurisdiction." Id. at 1053.
15. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1052.
16. Id. The court ruled that the June 1992 cutoff date for pre-existing contracts was
the effective date of the County plan. Id. Therefore, the Empire-Danella contracts were
exempt. Id. Also, the court invalidated the County plan under the Commerce Clause, to the
extent that it prohibited transportation of waste to sites outside Pennsylvania. Id.
17. Id. at 1053.
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commonwealth court granted DER's motion contesting the court's
original jurisdiction, while also granting Empire's motion by issuing
a declaratory judgment that the flow control provisions of the
County plan were unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 8
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the
commonwealth court.19 The supreme court ruled that Empire and
Danella failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not
appealing the County plan to the Environmental Hearing Board
("EHB"). 20 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that the aggrieved party exhaust all adequate and available
administrative remedies before requesting judicial review.21 Because
the EHB has sole jurisdiction over challenges to county plans
approved by the DER, the court ruled that Empire and Danella
failed to exhaust their available administrative remedies by failing
to appeal to the EHB.
22
The court next addressed the issue of whether Empire and
Danella were foreclosed from challenging the constitutionality of
the County plan or the Act.23 The court noted an exception to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine that governs when
the administrative agency is unable to provide the requested
relief.24 The court reasoned that, although the EHB can review
constitutional questions about the regulations, the EHB does not
have the power to grant declaratory judgments and injunctive
relief; therefore, the commonwealth court did not err in exercising
its jurisdiction on the declaratory judgment issue.
25
Having determined that jurisdiction was proper, the supreme
court addressed the validity of the County plan under the
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1059.
20. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1053. The EHB is empowered to resolve procedural and
substantive questions regarding the validity of actions taken by the DER. Beltrami
Enterprises, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 632 A.2d 989 (Pa. Commw. 1993).
21. Canonsburg General Hospital v. Commonwealth, 422 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa. 1980). The
purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to ensure that claims are
initially heard by a body having expertise in the specific area of controversy. Norristown
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 31 v. DeAngelis, 611 A.2d 322 (Pa. Commw. 1992).
22. Empire, 684 A2d at 1053. The court rejected Empire-Danella's argument that
original jurisdiction existed pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 761(a)(1) as an action against
the Commonwealth. The court cited the ripeness doctrine, which rejects judicial review if
the challenged administrative action is "abstract, hypothetical, or remote." Id. The record in
this case, according to the court, reflected no actions by the County or DER which would
make Empire-Danella's claim ripe for judicial review. Id. at 1054.
23. Id. at 1054.
24. Ohio Casualty Group Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 525 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 1987).
25. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1055.
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Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 26 The court
discussed the judicially created "Dormant" Commerce Clause that
limits the power of states to "erect barriers against interstate trade
where Congress has not affirmatively acted to authorize or forbid
the state activity."2 7 The court reviewed the two tests used in
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.2 First, if the ordinance
facially discriminates against interstate commerce, the court must
apply a strict scrutiny test.29 This strict scrutiny analysis invalidates
the statute unless it serves a legitimate local purpose and there are
no nondiscriminatory means available to serve the local interests
adequately °30  Secondly, if the ordinance does not facially
discriminate, the Supreme Court of the United States' analysis in
Pike v. Bruce Church must be used.31 The Pike test upholds an
ordinance unless the burden on interstate commerce clearly
exceeds local benefits.
32
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the Pike
analysis was proper because the County plan contained no facially
discriminatory language. 3 However, because the County plan
required that all county-generated waste be disposed of at
designated sites, and the county designated only facilities within
the county, the net effect of the County plan burdened interstate
commerce.3 The court also reviewed the Commerce Clause
implications of the Act itself.35 The Act required that all county
designated sites be approved by the Pennsylvania DER.36 The DER
was only authorized to approve Pennsylvania sites, however, the
result of this limitation was that all designated site had to be
located within Pennsylvania.
37
Having held that both the County plan and the Act burdened
26. Id. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states. Id. Furthermore, flow control ordinances have been determined to
implicate the Commerce Clause. See Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
27. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
28. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1055-56.
29. Id. at 1055.
30. Id. (citing Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994)).
31. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
32. Id.




37. Id. There are other burdens to designating sites located outside of the county. The
county must identify the general location where each facility must be located, and if the
selected facility is located outside of the county, the plan must explain in detail the reasons
for the selection of such a facility. Id. at 1057.
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interstate commerce, the court found that the Pike analysis
requires a determination of whether the burden on interstate
commerce is excessive in relation to the local benefits.8 The court
determined that the commonwealth court did not err when it ruled
that the local benefit (the certainty of available landfill space for
ten years) outweighed the burden on interstate commerce.3 The
supreme court, therefore, affirmed the commonwealth court's ruling
that the waste flow control provisions of the County plan were
unconstitutional.
40
The DER argued that the Commerce Clause should not apply
because the County was acting as a "market participant," not a
"market regulator."41 The court noted that when a county operates
a landfill and decides to give county residents a preference over
outsiders in the use of the landfill, the Commerce Clause is not
implicated.42 The court concluded, however, that since the County
was not a landfill operator and could only implement its contracts
by adopting the plan, the county was not a market participant and,
therefore, the plan was subject to the Commerce Clause.43
The court concluded by addressing the issue of Empire-Danella's
rights under their pre-existing contracts. 44 The court reasoned that
although Danella was not required to deliver any minimum amount
of waste to Empire under their contract, the commonwealth court
did not err in finding that the contract was enforceable.4 Also, the
court noted that, in Pennsylvania, statutes generally should not be
applied retroactively to a contractual relationship when the
38. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1057.
39. Id. at 1057. The commonwealth court concluded that the plan placed a significant
burden on interstate commerce because no county-generated waste could be transported to
an out-of-state facility. The local benefit of certain landfill space, according to the court, was
not adequate to overcome the burden on interstate commerce. Empire Sanitary Landfill v.
Commonwealth, 645 A.2d 413, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
40. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1057.
41. Id. The market participant doctrine allows the government the same freedoms as
other private parties competing in the market. This exception to the Commerce Clause is
based on the theory that the government is not enforcing restrictions under the threat of
prosecution, hence, the market participant doctrine generally applies when the government
enforces restrictions through a specific contract with a private party White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
42. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1057.
43. Id. at 1057-58. When a government entity is also a proprietor, it is free to contract
like any other private party. J.F Shea Co. v. City of Chicago, 992 F2d 745 (3d Cir. 1989).
44. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1058.
45. Id. The court noted that the term "acceptable waste" did not necessarily mean that
Danela was free not to deliver any waste to Empire. Id. Therefore, it concluded, that both
parties had changed their position in reliance upon the agreement. Id.
1998
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application would alter existing contractual obligations. 46 The court
decided that since neither the Act nor the County Plan affected
Danella and Empire until the plan was passed, the date the plan
became effective was the proper date from which agreements of
private parties should be subject to the Act.47 Therefore, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the
commonwealth court.48
The Supreme Court of the United States first applied a state
waste flow control law to the Commerce Clause in the 1978 case of
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.49 In Philadelphia, the Court
struck down the provision of a New Jersey statute that prohibited
the importation of waste from outside New Jerseym unless the
State Department of Environmental Protection: (1) determined that
such action would not negatively impact public health and safety,
and (2) promulgated regulations permitting and regulating its
treatment and disposal. 1 The Court concluded that "valueless"
municipal waste is an article of commerce worthy of constitutional
protection.5 2  Consequently, the Court invalidated the statute,
46. Id. at 1059. Although this is the general rule, statutes having an incidental effect
on contractual obligations satisfy the Contracts Clause if they are necessary for the public
good. DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500, 506-07 (1971).
47. Id. The court noted that the enactment of the Act notified the parties that, at some
point, future contracts would be subject to county plans. Id. However, until the county
ordinance was passed, the parties could not know what specific changes would be required
by the County plan. Id.
48. Id.
49. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
50. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 620. The statute affected private landfill operators and
cities outside New Jersey that had entered into agreements for waste disposal. Id. They
brought suit and were granted summary judgment by the trial court, which found the statute
unconstitutional. Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, found that the statute
advanced the State's legitimate health and environmental goals with little affect upon
interstate commerce. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm. v. Mun. Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
384 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978). The New Jersey DEP established
regulations that permitted four types of waste to enter New Jersey. These included:
1. Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2. Any separated waste material. .. that is free from putrescible materials and not
mixed with other solid or liquid waste that is intended for a recycling or reclamation
facility;
3. Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable secondary materials
4. Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste, bulk liquid, bulk semi-liquid, which is
to be treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste disposal facility which is
registered with the Department...
NJ. ADMN. CODE 7:1-4.2 (Supp. 1977).
52. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622. The court thus rejected the decision of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, which stated that harmful materials "are not legitimate subjects of
Vol. 36:689
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holding that regardless of the ultimate goal, it may not be
accomplished by restricting articles of commerce from coming into
the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differenty. The Supreme Court thus extended
constitutional protection to "garbage" for the first time, prohibiting
states from enacting legislation barring the import of waste from
other states.
In the 1992 case of Chemical Waste Mgt. v. Hunt,54 the Court
examined whether states could impose additional fees for disposal
of waste imported from other states.- An Alabama statute6
imposed an additional fee on the disposal of any hazardous waste
generated outside Alabama and disposed of at a facility located
within Alabama.57  The Court noted that the Act facially
discriminated against hazardous waste generated in other States by
imposing a heavier tax on the transaction when it crosses state
lines; therefore, the Act "invokes the strictest scrutiny of any
purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives."8 The Court concluded that the
Alabama act was unconstitutional because the only basis for the
act's "additional fee" was the origin of the waste, reasoning that
there was no evidence that out-of-state waste was more dangerous
than in-state waste.5 9 Finally, the Court suggested other less
trade and commerce." Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Mun. Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 384 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975).
53. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. The court, therefore, made no conclusion as to
the actual purpose of the statute. The Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that the
statute was designed to protect the State's environment with only a slight impact on
interstate commerce, while the appellants urged that the purpose of the state was primarily
financial. Id. at 626. They suggested that the goal was reduction of the total flow of waste
into landfills within New Jersey, thus, extending their lives and delaying the time when New
Jersey would need to export waste at a higher cost. Id. at 626.
54. Chemical Waste Mgt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992). The plaintiff operated a facility
in Emelle, Alabama that disposed of hazardous waste, 9096 of which was shipped in from
other states. Id. at 337-38.
55. Id.
56. ALA CODE §§ 22-30B-1-22-30B-18 (1990 and Supp. 1991).
57. Chemical Waste Mgt., 504 U.S. at 336. Specifically, the Act imposed a "base fee" of
$25.60 per ton on all hazardous waste disposal, but imposed an "additional fee" of $72.00 per
ton on waste generated outside Alabama and disposed of within Alabama. ALA CODE
§ 22-30B-2(b).
58. Chemical Waste Mgt., 504 U.S. at 342-43. The court concluded that the Act facially
discriminated against interstate commerce, hence, the court rejected the State's argument
that the reduced scrutiny test of Pike was applicable. Id. at 342. "[T]he Act's additional fee
on its face targets only out-of-state hazardous waste. While no 'clear line' separates close
cases on which scrutiny test should apply, 'this is not a close case.'" Id.
59. Id. at 344. Alabama set forth several "legitimate local interests that cannot be
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discriminatory alternatives that would alleviate the health and
safety risks. These included: "1) a generally applicable per-ton
additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of in Alabama, 2) a
per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting hazardous waste across
Alabama, or 3) an evenhanded cap on the total amount to be
landffled."' Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, also suggested
alternatives such as: 1) tax breaks for Alabama industries that
generate hazardous waste, or 2) a state operated facility exempt
from Commerce Clause scrutiny under the market participant
doctrine. 61  The Court, therefore, showed skepticism toward
environmental protection arguments favoring restrictions on the
interstate commerce of waste, citing several alternatives to achieve
purported environmental goals without implicating interstate
commerce.
On the same day in 1992, in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,2 the Supreme Court first
addressed whether a state could restrict the movement of
municipal waste within the state.6 In Fort Gratiot, the Supreme
Court struck down a provision in the Michigan Solid Waste
Management Act6 that prohibited private landfill operators from
accepting solid waste originating outside the county in which the
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives," including: (1) protection of
health and safety of Alabama citizens, (2) conservation of Alabama's environment, (3)
provision for revenue for the costs and burdens imposed on Alabama by out-of-state
generators, and (4) reduction in the overall flow of waste traveling on Alabama's highways,
thus, reducing the health and safety concerns that the Alabama statute purported to address.
Id. at 343. The court rejected the state's concerns, however, because "rhetoric, and not
explanation, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous waste to meet
these goals." Id. at 343.
60. Id. at 344.
61. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "a safe and
attractive environment is the commodity really at issue," and that "the State may pursue
such an objective by means less Draconian than an outright ban" on "waste disposal
altogether." Id. at 350.
62. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S.
353 (1992).
63. Id.
64. 1978 MIcH. Comp. LAWS §§ 299.401-299.437 (1984 ed. and Supp. 1991). Michigan's
Solid Waste Management Act ("SWMA") required each Michigan county to adopt a plan for
disposal, at facilities complying with state health standards, of all solid waste estimated to
be generated in the county over the next twenty years. Id. at 425. Fort Gratiot received a
permit from the Department of Natural Resources to operate a landfill in St. Clair County,
and then submitted an application to the St. Clair Solid Waste Planning Committee for
permission to accept out-of-state waste. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 356. This request was
rejected, although Fort Gratiot promised to reserve enough landfill space to dispose of all
county generated waste for the next twenty years. Id. at 356.
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facility was located, unless the state Department of Natural
Resources explicitly approved acceptance of such waste." The
Court reasoned that the Michigan statute violated the Constitution
because a State may not avoid the Commerce Clause by restricting
commerce through its counties-. Under the Michigan law,
out-of-state waste producers were unable to compete for local
waste disposal unless the county acted affirmatively to permit other
waste to enter its jurisdiction. 67 Furthermore, the Court stated that
because the Waste Import Restrictions "unambiguously
discriminate" against interstate commerce, the State was required
to show that it could not attain its objective of safe disposal of
future waste through reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.68 In
this case, however, there was no evidence of health and safety
reasons to limit only out-of-state waste; therefore, the State failed
to meet its burden.r In Fort Gratiot, the Supreme Court held that
states that imposed restrictions on the movement of municipal
waste across county lines within the state violated the
Constitution.70
In 1994, the Court was faced with two more cases involving
waste flow control regulations. In Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, the Supreme Court addressed whether a
state could assess a cost-based surcharge on the in-state disposal
of out-of-state-generated solid waste.7 The Court invalidated the
portion of an Oregon law72 that imposed an additional fee on
out-of-state waste "based on the costs to the State of Oregon and
its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated
out-of-state which are not otherwise paid for."73 The State argued
that the purpose of the law was merely to recoup the costs of
65. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 353.
66. Id. at 361.
67. Id. at 360.
68. Id. at 366-67.
69. Id. at 367. The Court acknowledged that its conclusion would differ if the same
out-of-state waste presented additional or different health and safety concerns than in-state
waste. Id. The Court noted the difference between economic protectionism and health and
safety regulation, citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), which upheld a ban on
importation of out-of-state baitfish into Maine because the fish were subject to parasites
foreign to Maine baitfish. Id.
70. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367.
71. Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
72. OR REv. STAT. § 459.297(1). The law imposes a "surcharge" on "every person who
disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site." Id.
73. Id. at § 459.298. The resulting surcharge was $3.10 per ton for out-of-state waste,
but only $0.85 per ton for Oregon waste. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 96.
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disposing out-of-state waste in Oregon, because interstate
transporters purportedly did not pay their share of the costs
through general taxation, unlike in-state residents.74 In response,
the Court stated, (1) "the purpose of, or justification for, a law has
no bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory,"75 and (2) "a law
is discriminatory if it taxes a transaction or incident more heavily
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the
State."76 Having found that the statute discriminated against
interstate commerce, the State was required to show that no
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives existed to solve
legitimate state concerns.77 The Court concluded that the State's
"failure to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal
to or exceeding the surcharge is fatal to [its] claim."7 8 However, the
Court again acknowledged the possibility that a State could
accomplish the same objectives if it were acting as a market
participant, thus escaping the net cast by the Commerce Clause.79
Later in 1994, the Court, in Carbone v. Clarkstown,80 examined
whether a New York flow control ordinance violated the Commerce
Clause when it required all solid waste to be processed at a
designated transfer station before leaving the town.8' In Carbone,
the town ordinance required that all nonhazardous waste within the
town be sent to a single designated facility at a higher cost than
the price available in the private marketplace.8 2 Carbone operated a
74. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 104. The Court rejected the general taxation argument
stating that the surcharge and the in-state taxation are not "substantially equivalent events."
Id. Also, the Court noted that out-of-state waste generators pay taxes in their home states, a
portion of which likely goes to waste disposal activities. Id.
75. Id. at 100. The Court acknowledged that if out-of-state waste was shown to be
more costly to dispose of than in-state waste, the statute would be constitutional because
"there would be a reason apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from outside the
State should be treated differently." Id. at 101 n.5. However, the evidence indicated that the
cost per ton for disposal for in-state waste was equal to that of out-of-state waste. Id.
76. Id. at 99 (citing Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 104.
79. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 106.
80. Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
81. Id. The purpose of the ordinance was to retain the fees charged by the facility to
pay for its $1.4 million price. Id. at 387. In order to build the facility, the town entered into
an agreement with a private contractor who agreed to build the facility and then operate it
for five years, after which the town would purchase the site for one dollar. Id. at 387. During
the five year period, however, the town was obligated to provide a minimum waste flow of
120,000 tons per year. Id. at 387. The contractor would subsequently charge waste haulers a
tipping fee of $81 per ton, thereby ensuring recoupment of the construction costs. Id. at 387.
82. Id. at 387.
1998 Empire Sanitary Landfill 699
recycling center in Clarkstown, New York. 3 Under the ordinance,
Carbone was required to send all nonrecyclable residue from its
facility to the designated facility and pay a tipping fee. 84 The Court
reasoned that the Commerce Clause applied because, although the
immediate impact of the ordinance was to direct waste to a facility
within the municipality, the ordinance had an economic impact that
was "interstate in reach," since out-of-state businesses could not
compete equally for the local market.85 The Court described the
article of commerce in this case as the service of processing and
disposing of waste rather than the waste itself.86 In that light, the
Court characterized the discrimination against interstate commerce
as favoring only the single local operator over all other potential
market competitors.8 7 Therefore, the ordinance was determined to
facially discriminate against interstate commerce.88 The Town was
required to show that it had no reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives to advance its legitimate local interest.8 The Court
found that nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as uniform safety
regulations, would be sufficient to solve the alleged health and
environmental issues.90 Furthermore, the Court determined that the
ordinance served only one purpose that a nonprotectionist
regulation would not; ensuring the profitability of the
town-sponsored facility, a local interest that did not justify
discrimination against interstate commerce.9t
Both the concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed with the
majority because, unlike previous waste flow control statutes
83. Id.
84. Id. at 388. The tipping fee was imposed on recyclers such as Carbone who were
required to send only their already separated nonrecyclable residue to the Clarkstown site.
Id.
85. Id. at 389. The Court came to this conclusion because the ordinance drove up the
cost for out-of-state interests to dispose of solid waste, due to the fact that the tipping fee
exceeded the equivalent cost on the private market. Id. Also, since all waste generated by
the town had to be processed at the designated site, the ordinance deprived out-of-state
businesses of access to the local market. Id.
86. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391. The discrimination was thus characterized as favoring
only the local operator within the town. Id.
87. Id. According to the Court, the fact that both in-state and out-of-state processors
are covered by the ordinance has no effect on the Commerce Clause analysis. Id.
88. Id. at 392.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 393. The Court rejected the environmentally based argument that the
ordinance was justified to ensure the safe handling and proper treatment of solid waste as
landfill space diminishes. Id.
91. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393. The Court suggested that the town subsidize the facility
through nondiscriminatory methods such as taxes or municipal bonds. Id. at 394.
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invalidated by the Supreme Court, the parties burdened by the
statute included parties located within Clarkstown, such as
Carbone.9 2 Justice O'Connor concluded that the ordinance did not
facially discriminate; hence, application of the Pike test was
proper.93 However, according to Justice O'Connor, the burden on
interstate commerce was excessive in relation to the local benefit
of financing the transfer facility.94 Justice Souter, in dissent, argued
that the Commerce Clause was not implicated at all since there
was no hint of economic protectionism in the ordinance, because
the "burden falls entirely on Clarkstown residents."9 5
In Empire, the Lehigh County plan made the transportation of
any waste generated within the County to a facility other than a
facility designated by the County unlawful. 96 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reasoned that this constituted non-facially
discriminatory language and, therefore, used the Pike balancing test
to determine its constitutionality.97 The Court determined that the
impact on interstate commerce was "clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits."
98
Specifically, both the County plan and the Act presented the
following problems: 1) under the Act, counties were forced to
choose facilities located within the state and had to justify, in
detail, the use of out-of-county facilities; 2) the Act required that
designated sites be approved by the Pennsylvania DER (however,
only Pennsylvania landfills can be so approved); and 3) the DER's
policy regarding waste disposal outside Pennsylvania was
inconsistent with the Act.9 Since the County Plan required DER
approval, the supreme court found that the impact on interstate
commerce was clear. Also, considering the County plan in concert
with the requirements of the Act, it can be argued that the County
plan and the Act were facially discriminatory. This reasoning, based
92. Id. at 404 (O'Connor J., concurring); and 427 (Souter J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 405 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor determined that the
ordinance did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, because it "discriminates
evenhandedly against all participants in the waste processing business, while benefiting only
the chosen operator of the transfer facility." Id. at 404.
94. Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested other means,
such as taxes, price reductions, and municipal bonds to finance the transfer station which
would have a less dramatic impact on interstate commerce. Id.
95. Id. at 427 (Souter J., dissenting).
96. Empire Sanitary Landfill v. Commonwealth, 645 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1994).
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on the Carbone strict scrutiny analysis, clearly invalidated both the
Act and the County plan.
The Dormant Commerce Clause has claimed several victims in
the waste flow control law arena. Although many commentators
fear that the result will be detrimental to the environment, 00 the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") found that "there is no
evidence that flow control either positively or negatively impacts
the statutorily assured level of environmental protection, because
the underlying regulatory requirements are controlling."101 Because
environmental protection has become such an important political
issue, it is inconceivable that Congress would allow the Commerce
Clause to stand in the way of local laws that are necessary to
protect the environment. Because federally mandated
environmental quality standards preempt local government
standards, little environmental improvement will result from rulings
such as Empire.
Federalism seems to dictate that state and local governments
control waste disposal management.'02 Many argue that waste
disposal (along with functions such as police, fire, and education)
is "a valid exercise of police power traditionally reserved to state
and local governments under the Tenth Amendment. "1°3 However,
because the threat to the health and safety of the public is
arguable, the burdens placed upon interstate commerce due to flow
control are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
100. See Rachel D. Baker, C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown: A Wake-Up Call for the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 DuKE ENvrL L & POL'Y J. 67, 92 (1995) (arguing that the loss
of revenue from flow control will force local governments to scale back their waste
management services, thus leading to continued use of old, inefficient, and unsafe waste
management facilities). See also Eric S. Peterson and David N. Abramowitz, Municipal Solid
Waste Flow Control in the Post-Carbone World, 22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 361, 416 (1995) (arguing
that without flow control ordinances, society's flow control needs will be left to a private
market that has no duty to protect public health and safety).
101. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Municipal and
Solid Waste Division, Report to Congress, Flow Controls and Municipal Solid Waste II -6
(March 1995).
102. Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Garbage Have Standing?: Democracy, flow
Control and a Principled Constitutional Approach to Municipal Solid Waste Management,
11 PACE Esvri L REv. 157 (1993). Diederich argues that federal courts should not be allowed
to dictate how local governments manage municipal solid waste. He reasons that
management of solid waste is fundamentally a local activity protected by federalist
principles, and consistent with the federal/state relationship defined by Congress when it
enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA7) as it applies to
non-hazardous solid waste management Id.
103. Jason J. Asuncion, Note, Environmental Law - Solid Waste Disposal The
Dormant Commerce Clause and Traditional Government Functions - C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994), 14 TEMP. ENVTL L & TcH. J. 77 (1995).
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benefits."104
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that a Lehigh
County solid waste flow control plan requiring transportation of all
solid waste generated within the county to one of three designated
facilities selected by the county pursuant to the County plan
approved by the Pennsylvania DER violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.10 5 A review of
the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States
demonstrates that the rationale of the Empire court is in total
accord. The Lehigh County flow control plan burdened interstate
commerce because it prevented out-of-state waste disposal firms
from competing on an even playing field.10 6 The local benefit,
ensuring local waste disposal space for ten years (i.e., economic
protectionism), was clearly insufficient to overcome the burden
placed upon interstate commerce. 07
The restrictions imposed by the Dormant Commerce Clause on
the ability of state and local governments to regulate the flow of
municipal waste have serious consequences for Pennsylvania. The
Commonwealth imports more municipal waste, by far, than any
other state.'t 8 Although Pennsylvania accepts waste from
twenty-two states,' 9 most comes from New York and New Jersey."0
Therefore, although the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and
Waste Reduction Act significantly increased the available municipal
landfill space in Pennsylvania, it also made Pennsylvania a low-cost
alternative for the out-of-state trash market."' Consequently,
Pennsylvania landfill space is being consumed rapidly by
out-of-state sources. In addition, the exporting states have no
incentive to reduce waste or initiate in-state disposal strategies.
What can Pennsylvania do to slow this deluge? At this point,
there appears to be very little. Governors Casey and Ridge have
104. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
105. Empire, 684 A.2d at 1056.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Peter J. Shelly, Landfill Officials Dumped Cash Into PAC Law Firm's Fund,
Oiled Campaigners' Wheels, PrMrSBURGH POST-GAzETE, Oct. 22, 1997, at Al. In 1995,
according to the National Solid Wastes Management Association, Pennsylvania imported 6.7
million tons of garbage, while the next largest importer, Virginia, took in only 1.7 million
tons. Id.
109. Brett Lieberman, Waste Imports Spark Interstate Feud // State Irked by
Top-Receiver Title, Loss of Capacity, SUN PATRIOT-NEws [HARRISBURG, PA.], July 7, 1996, at B1.
110. Id. According to this article, New York accounts for 41% of imports, while New




implored Congress to pass legislation that would allow states to
limit trash imports. 112 These efforts have failed in the face of
opposition from exporting states and the waste-hauling and
disposal industries."
3
Because Pennsylvania has at least ten years of waste disposal
capacity, the disposal market is flooded - consequently,
Pennsylvania disposal prices have dropped. Although the
Pennsylvania legislature should have foreseen this result, and the
subsequent response by neighboring states with no such capacity, it
did not. As a result, Pennsylvania is now the recipient of garbage
from all over the country. On August 29, 1996, Governor Ridge
issued an executive order designed to slow the licensing process
for new landfills and expansions to existing landfills." 4 In the short
term, however, it is likely that only Congress, pursuant to its
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, can aid
waste-importing states such as Pennsylvania.
Donald R. Palladino
112. Shelly, supra note 108, at Al; Timothy McNulty, Interstate Waste Controls Die in
the House, PrrrsBBRGH POST-GAZevrE, Sept. 13, 1996, at B7.
113. Shelly, supra note 108, at Al.
114. Adam Bell, Trash Reviews to Stiffen / State Seeks to Slow Landfill Growth as
Imports Soar, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Aug. 30, 1996, at B1. Specifically, the order compels DEP
to improve its review of permits and make sure all existing facilities are in compliance with
current laws. Id. Governor Ridge also sought repeal of the nine-month deadline within which
DEP is required to react to applications for permits. Maura Webber, Plans to Limit' Imported
Waste Get Subdued Response, PumaA Bus. J., Sept. 20, 1996, at 9.
1998

